Black and white photo of the Statue of Liberty facing away, with the moon visible in the sky and a distant sailboat on the water. Buildings and trees line the horizon in the background.
Black and white photo of the Statue of Liberty facing away, with the moon visible in the sky and a distant sailboat on the water. Buildings and trees line the horizon in the background.

American Muslim Poll 2025: Evolving Electorate, Enduring Challenges

BY SAHER SELOD, PHD, DALIA MOGAHED, ERUM IKRAMULLAH, AND SARAH BAKER
PUBLICATION DATE
Published October 21, 2025

Introduction

After the 2024 presidential election and second inauguration of President Donald Trump, ISPU conducted our seventh American Muslim Poll, fielded by NORC at the University of Chicago between April 2, 2025, and May 8, 2025. The genocide in Gaza, as declared by the International Association of Genocide Scholars in August 2025, and the attacks on American students protesting it created a challenging new environment for American Muslims, who experienced heightened censorship and skyrocketing Islamophobia (IAGS, 2025). 

As these hardships mounted, so did civic participation: Many Muslims organized to withhold their vote from then-President Joe Biden and, after his withdrawal, new nominee Vice President Kamala Harris in the election in an effort to demand a ceasefire in Gaza. There were also Muslims who disagreed with this approach and endorsed the Democratic candidate, which created tensions within Muslim communities. Meanwhile, Trump secured votes from other American Muslims. How did Muslims ultimately vote in 2024? This survey captures vote shares among the splintered electorate, along with policy priorities, satisfaction with President Trump and the direction of the country, and experiences with discrimination in both interpersonal and institutional settings.

This survey provides an update on the demographic profile of American Muslims last collected in ISPU’s 2022 poll. Included in the survey is the general population as well as an oversampling of Muslims and Jews, who are underrepresented religious groups in the United States whose distinct experiences are rarely polled. As a result, our report is able to compare the responses of American Muslims to Jews, Catholics, Protestants, white Evangelicals, and individuals who are not affiliated with any religion. Furthermore, the data was further broken down by race, gender, and age. 

As in past polls, survey respondents were asked a series of questions about voting and civic engagement. In this survey, participants were asked about who they voted for in 2024 as well as 2020 to identify shifts in voting preferences for American Muslims in light of Israel’s actions in Gaza and the U.S. response to it, which our survey questions refer to as “the war in Gaza.” Respondents were also asked about their policy priorities when it comes to choosing a presidential candidate, as well as satisfaction with several of President Trump’s policies. Their level of engagement with the political process aside from voting was also captured through a series of questions on civic engagement.

The Islamophobia Index was measured for a fifth time, enabling ISPU to provide a snapshot of where various faith and non-faith groups rank on the Islamophobia scale. We are able to assess if the war in Gaza shifted any faith group’s attitudes toward Muslims. Furthermore, by repetitively surveying Americans on their attitudes toward Muslims, we are able to compare levels of Islamophobia in the U.S. over time and assess whether it is increasing or decreasing.

The report concludes with a series of recommendations identified by the researchers on addressing the important issues facing American Muslims.

Executive Summary 

Muslims in the United States Are Young and Diverse

Consistent with prior polls, we find that Muslims are more likely than Jews, Catholics, Protestants, white Evangelicals, the non-affiliated, and the general public to be younger; 26% of Muslims are between the ages of 18 and 24 compared to 7%–15% of the other groups. Muslims remain the most racially diverse religious group in the U.S. and the one group without a majority racial/ethnic group. Twenty-eight percent of Muslims identify as Black, 24% as Asian, 20% as white, 12% as Arab, and 9% as Hispanic. 

Muslims in the U.S. on Par with General Public in Education, Have Lower Income, and More Likely to Currently Be a Student

Consistent with prior polls, we find about one third of Muslims have a household income below $30,000, compared to 11%–21% of other groups. Additionally, 36% of Muslims hold a college degree or higher, on par with most other groups. Given the younger age of Muslims, it follows that they are more likely than all other groups to currently be a student in a two-year, four-year, graduate, or technical program (47% of Muslims vs. 6%–15% of all other groups). 

Muslims among the Most Likely Religious Groups in the U.S. to Rate Religion as Important

Nearly 9 in 10 Muslims (89%) rate religion as important to their daily life, lower than 97% of white Evangelicals but more likely than 44% of Jews, 72% of Catholics, and 82% of Protestants. Muslims of all ages and racial/ethnic groups are equally likely to rate religion as very important. Forty-four percent of Muslims attend religious services once a week or more, more likely than 10% of Jews, 22% of Catholics, and 23% of the general public and less likely than 59% of white Evangelicals. 

Muslim Voter Registration Rises Steadily since 2016

Eighty-five percent of Muslims who are legally eligible to vote in the U.S. report being registered to vote, which is less likely than 92% of Jews but on par with all other groups. Looking over time, we see a steady rise in Muslim voter registration from 60% in 2016. Despite Muslim voter registration being on par with most other groups in 2025, there is still room for growth. We find that among Muslims who are legally eligible to vote, women and non-white Muslims are least likely to be registered. These are demographics voter registration campaigns can make specific outreach to. 

Half of Muslim Voters Cast a Ballot for Kamala Harris in 2024, Less than One Third for Trump, More than One in Ten for Stein

Four in five Muslims registered to vote cast a ballot in the 2024 presidential election. Among Muslim voters, 50% voted for Harris, 31% for Trump, and 12% for Jill Stein. Among the general public, 50% of registered voters selected Harris, 45% selected Trump, and 0% selected Stein. Notably, among Muslim voters, men were far more likely than women to vote for Trump (42% of Muslim men vs. 17% of Muslim women). We did not find gender differences in any other group. Factors that predict voting for Trump among Muslim voters include Republican party affiliation, an income of $75,000 or more (compared to less than $30,000), being born in the U.S. (compared to being born outside of the U.S.), identifying as white (vs. any other race/ethnicity), and endorsing any anti-Muslim tropes (compared to not endorsing tropes). 

Muslim Votes Shifted between 2024 and 2020

Among Muslims who voted in the 2020 and 2024 presidential elections, 55% who voted for Biden in 2020 voted for Harris in 2024, and 82% who voted for Trump in 2020 also voted for him in 2024. Compared to the general public, Muslims were less likely to consistently vote for the Democratic candidate in both years but similarly voted Republican consistently. Our analysis reveals that 16% of Biden voters in 2020 shifted to a third-party candidate in 2024. In comparison, just 1% of Muslim Trump voters in 2020 voted third party in 2024. 

Muslim Voters Name Family/Friends and Party Affiliation as Top Influences on Their 2024 Candidate Choice

Slightly more than half of Muslim voters, 53%, selected family or friends as having an influence on their candidate selection for the 2024 election, followed by 49% reporting their political party affiliation having influence, and 40% who selected social media influencers. Fewer Muslim voters reported that local or religious leaders (35% for both) and national civic organizations associated with their religious group (36%) had an influence on their vote choice. 

Muslim Voters Name Economy/Jobs, War in Gaza, and Healthcare as Top Three Policy Priorities Influencing Their 2024 Vote

Forty-one percent of Muslims selected the economy and job creation as a top policy priority influencing their 2024 vote, followed by 35% who selected the war in Gaza and 23% who selected healthcare. The economy was also the most frequently selected policy priority for the general public at 50%, which is higher than Muslims. Just 4% of voters in the general public named the war in Gaza as a policy priority, while 18% named healthcare. For the general public, securing the border (34% of general public voters vs. 16% of Muslim voters) and preserving democracy (26% of general public voters vs. 12% of Muslim voters) were also top policy priorities. Thirty percent of Muslims who voted for Trump named the war in Gaza as a top policy priority, compared to 2% of Trump supporters in the general public. Twenty-two percent of Muslims who voted for Harris said Gaza was a top policy priority, compared to 6% of Harris voters in the general public. Seventy-eight percent of Muslims who voted third party in 2024 named Gaza as a top policy priority.

Muslims Report Economic Insecurity, Fear, and Stress as a Result of the 2024 Election

Forty-four percent of Muslims report fear of economic insecurity for themselves or a member of their household as a result of the 2024 presidential election outcome, on par with most other groups. However, Muslims and Jews are more likely than all other groups to report fear for their personal safety (29% of Muslims and 23% of Jews vs. 3%–20% of other groups). We previously asked this question in 2017 about post-2016 election concerns. When comparing 2017 and 2025, we find an increase in the proportion of Muslims who report stress and anxiety enough to seek help from a mental health professional (13% in 2017 vs. 22% in 2025). At the same time, the proportion of Muslims who report fearing for their personal safety dropped from 38% in 2017 to 29% in 2025. 

Muslim Satisfaction with the Direction of the Country and Presidential Approval Drops

Muslim satisfaction with the direction of the country declined for the first time since 2018 with a sizable drop from 48% in 2022 to 23% in 2025. This is also a drop from the 41% who previously expressed satisfaction with the direction of the country in 2017 during President Trump’s first term. Muslims are on par with the general public, Jews, Catholics, and Protestants in satisfaction with the direction of the country. About one fifth (21%) of Muslims in the U.S. approve of President Trump’s job performance, which is on par with Jews (17%) and the non-affiliated (20%) but lower than Protestants (41%), Catholics (34%), white Evangelicals (63%), and the general public (32%). The 21% of Muslims who approve of the president’s performance is a significant drop from the 60% who approved of Biden in 2022. Muslim men were more likely than Muslim women to approve of Trump’s job performance (27% vs. 14%). 

Muslim Civic Engagement with Elected Officials Increased since 2019

The American Muslim Poll evaluates non-electoral civic engagement through town hall participation, campaign activity, and contact with public officials. We previously asked about engagement with local and national elected officials in 2019. In 2025, 22% of Muslims reported contacting a federal elected official, compared to 17% of the general public in 2025 and 17% of Muslims in 2019. On the other hand, 31% of the general public previously reported engaging with federal elected officials in 2019, marking a decline. Nineteen percent of Muslims and 18% of the general public contacted a local elected official in 2025. Muslims (23%) and Jews (18%) were more likely than 4%-10% of other groups to attend a town hall in the previous year. Similarly, Muslims (15%) and Jews (12%) were more likely than 3%–8% of all other groups to volunteer for a political campaign in the prior year. Nineteen percent of Muslims donated to a political campaign in the year prior, less than 30% of Jews but on par with other groups. 

Aside from Gender Definition, Majority of Muslims Oppose Trump Policies

Slightly more than half (52%) of Muslims expressed support for defining gender as male and female, on par with 50% of the general public. Majorities of Catholics (53%), Protestants (65%), and white Evangelicals (84%) also expressed support. The majority of Muslims oppose all other Trump policies we asked about (see page XX for full list of policies). Looking across all groups, white Evangelicals were most supportive of Trump policies, with the majority supporting all policies except the proposed forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza (31%) and proposed cuts to Medicare and Medicaid (19%). Muslim men tend to be more supportive of Trump’s policies than Muslim women. Muslims and Jews show comparable levels of support for Trump-era policies, including those on Gaza, with the notable exception being support for Trump’s policy on gender definitions (52% of Muslims support vs. 33% of Jews). 

Majority of Trump Supporters Oppose Displacement of Gazans

Fewer than half of Muslims who voted for Trump in 2024 (46%) expressed support for the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, on par with 39% of Trump voters in the general public. Trump voters in the general public, however, were more likely than Muslim Trump voters to support deporting pro-Palestinian protesters (58% vs. 45%, respectively). 

Muslims Who Voted Third Party in 2024 Aligned with Harris Voters in the General Public on Most Trump Policies

Muslims who voted for Harris in 2024 were more likely than Harris voters in the general public to support President Trump’s policies. Rather, Muslims who voted third party were more in line with Harris voters in the general public. Specifically, 1%–13% of Harris voters in the general public expressed support for the various Trump policies, in line with 2%–13% of Muslims who voted outside of the two-party candidates.

Islamophobia Linked to Higher Support for Trump Policies

Among the general public, Islamophobia is a meaningful, significant predictor of all policies we asked about except for two: 1) cutting Medicare/Medicaid and 2) reducing the federal workforce. Among Muslims, Islamophobia is a significant predictor of support for all of the Trump policies we tested except 1) the recognition of only two sexes; 2) support for tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China; 3) the creation of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), and 4) reducing the federal workforce.

Muslim Experience with Religious Discrimination Holds Steady, More Likely than All Other Groups

Sixty-three percent of Muslims report facing religious discrimination in the past year, more likely than 50% of Jews and 22%–27% of other religious groups. The 63% for Muslims in 2025 is on par with previous years (2016–2022) where reports of religious discrimination ranged from 59%–62%. Muslims experience religious discrimination in both structural and social settings. Muslim men are as likely as Muslim women to report facing religious discrimination in the past year (63% of Muslim women and 64% of Muslim men). 

Nearly Half of Muslim Families Report Children Facing Religious Bullying, Often from Adults in Authority

Forty-seven percent of Muslim families with school-aged children report having a child who faced religious-based bullying in the past year, compared to 23% among the general public. This is on par with the 48% of Muslim families who reported bullying in 2022. When it comes to who bullied the children, 55% report another group of students, 36% report a teacher or school official, and 13% report the bullying was from a parent of a classmate. 

Islamophobia Rises in 2025

For the fifth year, ISPU measures Islamophobia using the National Islamophobia Index. Among the general population in the U.S., the index jumped from 25 in 2022 to 33 in 2025. This jump was most pronounced among white Evangelicals (15 points) and Catholics (12 points). Jews had an Islamophobia score of 17 in 2022, the lowest of any group that year, which increased only slightly to 19 in 2025, on par with Muslims (19). Protestants also rose 7 points from 23 in 2022 to 30 in 2025. Muslims decreased on the Islamophobia Index from 26 in 2022 to 19 in 2025. Nevertheless, the existence of internalized Islamophobia for Muslims is a challenge to be addressed. The only group that did not change since 2022 were the non-affiliated (22 to 23). Looking at factors that predict Islamophobia, we find that a vote for President Trump (for the general public and Muslims) and conservative political views (for the general public) were among the strongest factors associated with higher Islamophobia scores. 

Methodology 

NORC at the University of Chicago fielded the 2025 American Muslim Poll, a survey developed by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), to nationally representative samples of U.S. Muslims, Jews, and the general population from April 2, 2025, through May 8, 2025. The study investigated opinions on politics, important issues facing the country, faith practices, and religious discrimination.

NORC interviewed 2,486 adults from the U.S. general population, including oversamples of 800 Muslim adults and 428 Jewish adults. These oversampled groups are weighted to match their respective proportion in the population. The survey was offered in English and Spanish and was administered in two modes depending on the preference of the respondent provided during the panel recruitment: 1) self-administered by the respondent online via the Web or 2) administered over the telephone by a live interviewer. Final data were weighted using NORC’s TrueNorth Calibration methodology. 

In total, NORC completed 2,430 interviews by Web and 56 by phone. NORC conducted the study on behalf of ISPU using NORC’s AmeriSpeak® Panel (n=1,743), the Generation Lab panel (n=515), and Dynata for the sample source (n=172). AmeriSpeak is a probability-based panel, Generation Lab has both probability and nonprobability-based panels, and Dynata is a nonprobability panel.

AmeriSpeak is the first U.S. multi-client household panel to combine the speed and cost-effectiveness of panel surveys with enhanced representativeness of the U.S. population, an industry-leading response rate, and an innovative and thorough Project Methods and Transparency Report. Since its founding by NORC at the University of Chicago in 2015, AmeriSpeak has produced more than 1000 surveys, been cited by dozens of media outlets, and become the primary survey partner of the nation’s preeminent news service, the Associated Press. AmeriSpeak is the most scientifically rigorous multi-client panel available in the U.S. market.

The questionnaire was developed by ISPU in consultation with a team of advisors and the NORC project team. Prior to the field period, NORC programmed the study into their data collection platform for both Web and phone administration (depending on the respondent’s preference). Extensive checking of the programming was conducted to ensure that skip patterns and sample splits followed the design of the questionnaire.

Final data were weighted using NORC’s TrueNorth Calibration methodology, as described below: 

AmeriSpeak Panel Weight: Since the sampling frame for the probability sample is the AmeriSpeak Panel, which itself is a sample, the starting point of the weighting process for the study is the AmeriSpeak panel weight and Generation Lab base weights. The panel weight reflects the cumulative panel recruitment selection probabilities, nonresponse adjustments, and calibration to population benchmarks, both at the household and individual levels.

Probability Base Weight: The AmeriSpeak Panel Weight is then adjusted to account for the sample selection probability from the panel under the study sample design. The base weight for the AmeriSpeak study sample is a product of the AmeriSpeak Panel Weight and the inverse of selection probabilities associated with sample selection from the panel. The Generation Lab base weights encode their two stage sampling methodology: the simple random sample of universities whose rostered students comprise the Generation Lab higher education frame, and then a stratified random sample of Muslim students from the frame contacted for this study.

Nonresponse Adjusted Probability Weight: The nonresponse adjusted weight for AmeriSpeak cases is created by adjusting the base weights for respondents to compensate for nonrespondents within nonresponse weighting classes defined by religion, age, race/ethnicity, gender, and education. Within each weighting class, the nonresponse adjusted weight is the product of the base weight and the inverse of the weighted response rate. The nonresponse adjusted weight for Generation Lab cases is created separately and in a similar fashion, by calculating the product of base weight and inverse weighted response rate within classes defined by race/ethnicity and gender. The Generation Lab nonresponse adjusted weight is then calibrated by age and education to the reference AmeriSpeak nonresponse adjusted weight for Muslim respondents; a lambda composition formula is used that properly accounts for sample size contribution from each panel source. 

The TrueNorth process solves a number of problems inherent to nonprobability samples and creates a pseudo-probabilistic and far less biased sample than nonprobability samples alone. This is mainly achieved by blending a much higher-quality and lower-bias probability sample with a nonprobability sample. But the real difference is in the sophisticated way in which TrueNorth combines these samples. 

The final TrueNorth weights delivered with the data for the combined sample are developed in three major steps. First, fit a weighted tree model to the combined probability and nonprobability sample. Second, based on the fitted tree model, estimate the probabilities of inclusion in the combined probability and nonprobability sample and compute the initial weights as the inverse of the estimated probabilities. Third, poststratification adjustments, including calibration to benchmarks and weight trimming, are made to the initial weights to create the final weights. Data for the general population are benchmarked to demographic estimates from the Census, the Current Population Survey (CPS), and Pew Research Center’s National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS). Data for Jewish and Muslim oversamples are benchmarked to the parameters listed in the SSRS-fielded 2022 American Muslim Poll, which were themselves derived from the SSRS Omnibus and Pew estimates.

The final design effects and margin of errors are as follows:

 

Total:

Study design effect: 3.63

Study margin of error: +/- 4.03%

 

Muslim:

Study design effect: 2.89

Study margin of error: +/- 6.35%

 

Jewish:

Study design effect: 2.20

Study margin of error: +/- 7.57%

NORC at the University of Chicago conducts research and analysis that decision-makers trust. As a nonpartisan research organization and a pioneer in measuring and understanding the world, NORC has studied almost every aspect of the human experience and every major news event for more than eight decades. Today, NORC partners with government, corporate, and nonprofit clients around the world to provide the objectivity and expertise necessary to inform the critical decisions facing society: www.norc.org

As part of their deliverable to ISPU, NORC at the University of Chicago produced bivariate, cross-tabular tables and statistical significance testing on all measures in the survey comparing results across the following groups: Muslims, Jews, Catholics, Protestants, white Evangelicals, the non-affiliated, and the general public. NORC also produced bivariate, cross-tabular tables and significance testing among Muslims and the general public by gender, race, age, and presidential candidate choice. We also analyzed questions asked across multiple years of American Muslim Polls to assess time trends and test for statistically significant differences over time. For several topics, the ISPU research team conducted further analyses such as factor analysis, predicted probabilities, and multivariate logistic regression for deeper investigation. These are noted in the relevant sections of the report. All results we report are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level or higher, unless noted otherwise.

The full study methodology is available here.

Downloads

Read the full report of ISPU’s American Muslim Poll 2022. American Muslim Poll 2022: A

August 23, 2022

Read the key findings of ISPU’s American Muslim Poll 2022. American Muslim Poll 2022: A

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